Does Negligence Toward A Husband Transfer To A Wife?
Clifford's Notes, Chicago Lawyer, 11/01/2007By Robert A. Clifford
The Illinois Supreme Court has decided it will revisit the issue of transferred negligence in the case of woman killed by her husband who was under the care of a medical health center.
The court will decide whether medical-malpractice liability can be applied to non-patient third parties in a marital relationship under the doctrine of transferred negligence.
The case involves Richard Street, who was referred to the Vandalia Community Resource Center after a psychiatric evaluation at Doctors Hospital in May 2003. A doctor discharged hm to the outpatient care of the center with a diagnosis of “major depression with mild psychotic features.” Doctors at the hospital never treated his psychotic symptoms, nor did they contact the center to coordinate his treatment.
The husband reportedly was suicidal. He told medical personnel that he thought that his wife, Teresa, was trying to poison him and their children, and he had threatened to kill his wife. He also had revealed a homicidal plan to a social worker at the center. He was not seen by a psychiatrist after his initial visit to a psychiatrist at Doctors Hospital.
At a follow-up visit to the center nearly four weeks later, Street said he wanted to be admitted to a mental hospital. Although an employee at the center contacted an inpatient facility, Street changed his mind, said he was feeling better, and agreed to see a family doctor.
The center prescribed some psychiatric medicine, consulted with his wife, and released Street to his home without adequate monitoring. His wife went to the center after he left, concerned about his care. She was given a business card to call the center or the police should a problem arise.
Three days later, he killed his wife and apparently attempted to kill himself with an overdose. He survived, pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, and is now serving an 18-year prison sentence.
Teresa Street’s estate and the guardians of her two children filed a wrongful death lawsuit against the center, three staff members, the hospital, and several doctors.
The Marion County circuit judge granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss both the direct and transferred negligence claims on the pleadings for lack of duty.
The Fifth District, however, reversed and remanded. The court stated that sufficient grounds existed for the complaint to move forward, not only on the theory of negligent performance of a voluntary undertaking – in the defendants’ failure to warn Teresa of her husband’s violent propensities after they had evaluated, treated, and controlled him for their protection – but also on the issue of transferred negligence. Tedrick, etc., et al. V. Community Resource Center Inc., et al., No. 104876 (5th Dist., decided May 17, 2007).
Justice James K. Donovan wrote the unanimous opinion, relying on the seminal case involving transferred negligence, Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 67 Ill.2d 348, 367 N.E.2d. 1250 (1977).
Renslow involved a minor patient who received incompatible blood in a transfusion. Eight years later the woman gave birth to a child with permanent, severe injuries as a result of the negligence. The medical provider never told her of the error nor its potential consequences.
Because of the “intimate relationship” of the mother and her baby, the Illinois Supreme court found that “the injury to the infant was alleged to be the direct result of the negligent treatment rendered to the mother,” the theory of transferred negligence applied. Tedrick, at 11, citing Renslow, at 356-57.
In Renslow, the court said, “This court has long recognized a duty may exist to one foreseeably harmed though he be unknown and remote in time and place [citations omitted]. Also, derivative actions, such as those of a husband or parent for the loss of the wife’s or child’s services demonstrates that the law has long recognized that a wrong done to one person may invade the protected rights of one who is intimately related to the first. [citation omitted] In these cases, because of the nature of the relationship between the parties harmed, the law recognizes a limited area of transferred negligence.” Renslow, 67 Ill.2d at 357 (emphasis added).
Ten years later, the Illinois Supreme Court reaffirmed the doctrine of transferred negligence but recognized its limited scope. Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center, 117 Ill.2d 07, 513 N.E.2d 387 (1987).
In Tedrick, the Fifth District found that, “In our view, the relationship, as alleged, between Teresa and Richard reaches the level of personal, familial intimacy that was present in Renslow. The injury inflicted on Teresa was physical and traceable to the allegedly negligent treatment of Richard’s mental health conditions.” Tedrick, at 13.
The center filed a petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court in September, which was accepted.
In considering this issue again, it is clear that the plaintiffs’ position in this case encompasses not only the “intimate relationship” to which the appellate court referred, but also the question of the duty of the medical provider for an injury that was foreseeable.
There is no question that the medical provider owed Richard Street a duty of care. Although the defendants had no duty to control the conduct of Richard Street because he was not committed to their custody and control, the Fifth District ruled that they d id have a duty to warn Teresa Street.
The defendants had voluntarily undertaken evaluation and treatment of Richard, and his wife relied upon those undertakings, assuming that they would have done whatever was necessary to keep her safe.
Teresa, 34, a waitress and mother of three, had no ability to know of the severity of her husband’s mental illness and the risk that it presented to her. The defendants here simply did not fulfill their duty, and it is a tragedy that Teresa Street paid for with her life.
The Fifth District also found that, under Renslow, given the special relationship of husband and wife, Teresa Street also was owed a duty of care through the doctrine of transferred negligence.
This is particularly true given that the defendants were aware that Richard has made specific threats on the life of his wife, and that Teresa had told the defendants, just days before he killed her, that she was concerned about his trying to carry out those threats.
Illinois law has long found that it is an important public policy to protect the health and welfare of its citizens. In doing so, the issue of duty is critical and, as the Renslow court found, in quoting Dean William Prosser, “‘[D]uty’ is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.” Renslow, 67 Ill.2d at 356, citing Prosser, Torts, section 53, at 325-26 (4th ed. 1971).
It is necessary, therefore, that the concept of duty be applied so that it fulfills the public policy of the state.
Under established Illinois case law as well as for public policy reasons, the Fifth District has embraced the doctrine of transferred negligence. In the months to come, we will see whether today’s Illinois Supreme Court will hold medical providers accountable for such conduct as well.

